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HOW TO CO-EXIST WITH NONEXISTENT EXPECTATIONS
RANDALL G. MCCUTCHEON
Abstract. We address the problem that gambles having undefined expecta-
tion pose for decision theory. Observing that to place a value on such a gamble
exposes one to a finitary diachronic Dutch Book, we defend a variant of Mark
Colyvan’s “Relative Expected Utility Theory” (REUT), noting that it has the
property of never preferring a gamble X to an identically distributed gamble Y .
We demonstrate, however, that even REUT subscribers succomb to diachronic
incoherence should they assign infinite expectation to a gamble they actually
confront. In a final section, we use basic principles of anthropic reasoning (as
formulated by Brandon Carter) to show why one needn’t ever do so.
1. A Diachronic Dutch Book against Pasadena Game Idealists
In Harris Nover and Alan Ha´jek’s Pasadena Game (2004) you win X dollars,
where
P
(
X =
(−1)n−12n
n
)
= 2−n, n = 1, 2, . . . .
Since the expectation series for X,∑
r∈R
rP (X = r) =
∞∑
n=1
(−1)n−12n
n
· 2−n = 1− 1
2
+
1
3
− 1
4
+ · · ·
converges conditionally (to log 2), X has no defined expectation.1 Expected utility
theory is, therefore, silent concerning the value of this game.2 Nover and Ha´jek
however write:
It is an uncomfortable silence. For intuition tells us...that we can make
meaningful comparisons between the Pasadena game and other games. It
is clearly worse than the St. Petersburg game [P (X = 2n) = 2−n], for
starters. It is clearly worse than a neighbouring variant of the game –call
it the Altadena game–in which every pay-off is raised by a dollar. (...)
And the Pasadena game is clearly better than a ‘negative’ St. Petersburg
game, in which all the pay-offs of the St. Petersburg game are switched
in sign. Yet expected utility theory can say none of this.
It does seem that one cannot coherently value the Pasadena gamble relative to
the null gamble. For suppose that you value it at log 2. (The problem will arise
1Like any conditionally convergent series, the expectation series can thus be made to diverge
(or converge to any finite value whatsoever) by rearrangement of its terms. On the other
hand, as noted by Kenny Easwaran (2008), X does have a weak expectation of log 2. Since
weak expectations are invariant under rearrangements, log 2 therefore has some claim to be the
presumptive value of the game, if it has one.
2We take utility to be linear with respect to currency, and in particular unbounded.
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for any finite value.) Then you can be Dutch Booked as follows. First you are
offered the chance to pay .69 < log 2 to play the game. You accept and are put
to sleep. While you sleep, your payoff will be determined as follows. First, a fair
4-sided die is rolled repeatedly until something less than a 4 is rolled. Let N be
the number of rolls it takes. Repeat the procedure and let M be the number of
rolls it takes the second time. Finally let Y be the result of a rolling of a fair
3-sided die. If Y = 3, let n = 2M . Otherwise, let n = 2N − 1. Your payoff is
now (−1)
n−12n
n
dollars (a Pasadena gamble). Note: if Y < 3 and n = 2N − 1 you
are winning money, whereas if Y = 3 and n = 2M you are losing money.
When all of the above is completed, you are awakened and told the value N (but
not M and not Y ). So you don’t know whether or not you’ve won, nor how much
you’ve lost if you’ve lost. You do however know that if you’ve won, you’ve won
22N−1 dollars. At this point, you are given the opportunity to annul the gamble
(but you don’t get your .69 back). As the expectation series for your payoff at
this stage is
2
3
· 22N−1 +
∞∑
M=1
1
22M
· −2
2M
2M
=
2
3
· 22N−1 − 1
2
− 1
4
− 1
6
− · · · = −∞,
you are compelled to accept this offer (indeed, you were let off easy–you would
have paid any finite amount to annul the gamble). You have thus lost a sure .69.
The upshot is that if you assign faithful implementations of Pasadena gambles
values and believe you are being offered one then your decision theory is diachron-
ically incoherent in a strong sense; you are vulnerable to a finitary Dutch Book.3
2. Other responses
Ha´jek and Nover (2006) write:
Here are...possible responses to the Pasadena game (...): 1. The game
is coherent, and decision theory cannot handle it–too bad for decision
theory. Compare: Russell’s paradox was a decisive blow against Frege’s
set theory. Too bad for that set theory. 2. The game is incoherent, so
it is not a black mark that decision theory cannot handle it–too bad for
the game. Compare: the town barber, who shaves all and only those in
the town who do not shave themselves, poses no problem for logic, or for
anything else; he simply cannot exist, because the specification of him is
incoherent. Too bad for the barber. (...) We maintain response (1)....
Ha´jek and Nover’s appeal to Russell’s paradox in (1) is problematic. The challenge
for set theory upon discovery of the “Russell object” was to sidestep paradox
while retaining such sets as the sincere mathematician requires. The standard
3By Finitary Dutch Book we intend a finite sequence X1, · · ·XN of gambles, either offered all
at once (a synchronic DB) or across time, with information gathering conducted between bets
(a diachronic DB; in the diachronic case we allow that N , so long as E(N) < ∞, and the Xi
may be random variables) deemed individually favorable but together entailing an almost sure
net loss and having the property that
∑
iE(min{Xi, 0}) > −∞ almost surely.
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response to the paradox, accordingly, has been to build into set theory appropriate
admissibility criteria on sets. If we likewise view the Pasadena game’s challenge
to decision theory as that of sidestepping paradox while retaining such gambles as
the sincere decision theoretic agent requires, then the best response to the game
should be (just what Ha´jek and Nover don’t want) to build into decision theory
appropriate admissibility criteria on comparisons.
On the topic of restrictions, Ha´jek and Nover write: “There are two possible
lines of attack–neither satisfactory, in our opinion. (...) Restrict decision theory
to finite state spaces (...) Restrict decision theory to bounded utility functions.”
Nicholas J.J. Smith (2014), notably, defends a hybrid of these:
Rationally negligible probabilities (RNP): For any lottery featuring in any
decision problem faced by any agent, there is an  > 0 such that the agent need
not consider outcomes of that lottery of probability less than  in coming to a
fully rational decision.
For variables of finite expectation, RNP is fairly harmless; as → 0, the relative
effect of employing RNP instead of standard expectation tends to zero with
. In this sense, RNP is an extension of (finite) expected utility theory. This
observation can be used to respond to Ha´jek (2014), who seeks to discredit RNP
using a zero expectation gamble (credited to John Matthewson) which RNP’s
vanishing error term causes to look favorable (if infinitesimally). But although
finite expectation gambles fail to discredit this more robust limit version of RNP,
even it sanctions some embarrassing preferences.
Game: A dime is tossed until it comes up heads (on the nth toss). Then a nickel
is tossed. If the nickel comes up heads, you win 2n dollars. If it comes up tails,
you lose 2n dollars.
RNP instructs us to ignore outcomes having probability below some threshold
 > 0. So there is an n depending on  such that Game’s value is:
(.25)(2)−(.25)(2)+(.125)(4)+(−.125)(4)+ · · ·+(2−n−1)(2n)+(−2−n−1)(2n) = 0.
Thus the value of Game is zero, independently of .
Now consider a variant of Game in which, if the nickel lands heads, a penny is
also tossed. If the penny lands heads, it is added to your winnings. Otherwise
everything is as before. This variant’s value is:
(−.25)(2) + (.125)(2.01) + (.125)(2) + (−.125)(4) + (.0625)(4.01) + (.0625)(4)
+(.0625)(8) + · · ·+ (2−n−1)(2n−1 + .01) + (2−n−1)(2n−1) + (2−n−1)(2n) < −.49.
This inequality holds independently of .
So according to RNP, Game has value V1 = 0 and the variant V2 < −.49,
independently of . But the only difference between Game and the variant is
that in the latter there is a penny that you might get to keep.
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3. Relative Expected Utility Theory
The failures of RNP and other approaches involving bounded utility functions
and credence functions supported on finitely many points notwithstanding, we
believe that there is a good way to avoid paradox by restriction. Indeed, Mark
Colyvan has been championing an approach along these lines that is promis-
ing. First he pointed out (see Colyvan 2006) that a preference for Altadena over
Pasadena can be established by dominance reasoning. Next (see Colyvan 2008) he
formulated a “relative expected utility theory”, a joint extension of finite expected
utility theory and just this sort of dominance reasoning:
REU Dominance: Let X be any random variable taking values in the
natural numbers N = {1, 2, . . .}. Let Game A pay ai and let Game B
pay bi when X = i, i ∈ N. Put REU(A,B) =
∑∞
i=1 P (X = i)(ai − bi)
if the right hand side converges or diverges to infinity. Then Game A
is preferable to Game B if and only if REU(A,B) > 0.
In this original formulation, REU Dominance has several undesirable features.
Among these are (a) its recommendations depend upon the way in which one
orders the alternatives; and (b) it may indicate a preference for a gamble X over
an identically distributed gamble Y 4. Colyvan and Ha´jek (2016) accordingly make
two emendations to REU dominance. The first is to insist that REU(A,B) only
be defined when the sum
∑
i∈N P (X = i)(ai− bi) is insensitive to the ordering of
the indices.5 (See also footnote 12 in Bartha 2016.) This fixes problem (a), and
as we’ll presently see (Theorem 1 below), it also fixes problem (b).
Colyvan and Ha´jek don’t stop there, however. They proceed to introduce a second
emendation. We will make a digression to discuss this second emendation (which
we will ultimately reject). They motivate it by a comparison of the following bets:
Bet 1: Pays 5 if a fair coin toss lands heads; nothing otherwise;
Bet 2: Pays 6 if a fair die toss lands even; nothing otherwise.
They write:
4For example, let the state probabilities pi = P (X = i) be given by (p1, p2, . . . , ) =
( 14 ,
1
8 ,
1
16 ,
1
4 ,
1
32 ,
1
64 ,
1
128 ,
1
8 ,
1
256 ,
1
512 ,
1
1024 ,
1
16 ,
1
2048 , . . .). (The pattern is p4n+4 =
1
2p4n, p4n+i =
1
8p4n+i−4, i = 1, 2, 3.) Next let (a1, a2, . . . , ) = (2, 4, 8, 0, 16, 32, 64, 0, 128, 256, 512, 0, 1024, . . .)
and (b1, b2, . . . , ) = (0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 0, 0, 8, 0, . . . ). Then aX and bX are identically dis-
tributed, but REU dominance judges aX preferable to bY . (In particular,
∑4n
i=1 pi(ai − bi) =
n→∞.)
5What Colyvan and Ha´jek actually say is that REU(A,B) =
∑∞
i=1 P (X = i)(ai− bi) “where
the right-hand side absolutely converges, or diverges to infinity or negative infinity.” That
generates sensitivity to order, as any conditionally convergent series has rearrangements tending
to (positive or negative) infinity. We believe that our formulation corresponds to their intention.
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As things currently stand, RET is silent on this case because there
are no states in common across the two bets: ‘heads on a toss of a
fair coin’ and ‘even number on a roll of a fair die’ are, on the face of
it, different states. Yet, we want to say that (Bet 2) is preferable to
(Bet 1) by compelling dominance-like reasoning. The obvious move to
make here is to stipulate that we can identify ‘heads on a toss of a
fair coin’ and ‘even on a roll of a fair die’ because they have the same
probability, and that’s all that matters. We thus supplement RET with
this probabilistic identification of states: the states under one action
can be identified with the states under a different action in the same
decision problem iff there is a one-to-one correspondence between the
two sets of states that maps each state under one action to a state of
equal probability under the second action.
The resulting theory (call it “supplemented RET”) has some counter-intuitive
features. For example, let W pay 2n when a fair coin lands heads on the nth
toss (a St. Petersburg gamble). Then supplemented RET prefers W + 1 to an
independent St. Petersburg gamble V , but does not prefer U + 1 to V , where
U pays 2n when a fair die lands six on the nth roll. Examples like this seem
to indicate clearly that a strict, measure preserving one-to-one correspondence
between states wasn’t quite general enough for what they had in mind. One
might think of ways to extend the domain of comparison to fix this problem.
There are, however, worse problems in the vicinity. To illustrate, let W be a St.
Petersburg gamble. Toss a fair coin independently of W and let
X = W if heads; otherwise X = 0.
Y = W if tails; otherwise Y = 0.
An agent accepting supplemented RET will be indifferent between X and Y .
However, she will not discriminate at all between Y − X and 0 (not, at least,
without further supplementation). That is odd. For surely such an agent will
be indifferent between the status quo and an arrangement where she borrows X
and repays it immediately. Combining that with her indifference between X and
Y would appear to yield an indifference between Y − X and 0, since to borrow
X, exchange it for Y and then repay the X simply yields a net gain of Y − X.
Indeed, Seidenfeld et. al. (2009) propose the following as a desideratum:
Coherent Indifference: The difference of two indifferent variables should be
indifferent from the zero variable.
The example about X and Y hangs on a comparison for which supplemented
RET fails to make a discrimination. So far, then, this example looks like the frist
one we considered...perhaps supplemented RET’s domain of comparison could
be extended in some way so as to restore Coherent Indifference. This strat-
egy can’t work, though. Indeed, a desideratum with similar motivating virtues
is transitivity of the indifference relation6, and an example from Seidenfeld et.
6If one is willing to trade X for Y and willing to trade Y for Z then it seems that one ought
to be willing to trade X for Z (the net result of conducting both trades).
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al. 2009 shows that no consistent extension of supplemented RET satisfies both
transitivity and Coherent Indifference.
To see this, suppose that CH is an extention of supplemented RET satisfying
transitivity and Coherent Indifference and let X be a geometric random vari-
able with P (X = n) = 2−n, n = 1, 2, . . .. Let a fair coin be tossed independently
of X, and let W = 2X (a St. Petersburg variable). Next let
W1 = 2W if heads and W1 = 2 if tails;
W2 = 2 if heads and W2 = 2W if tails
Using the obvious identifications of their states, one easily checks that W , W1
and W2 are mutually indifferent under supplemented RET, and hence under CH.
By Coherent Indifference, then, we get that both W1 −W and W −W2 are
indifferent from 0 under CH and so (by transitivity), from each other. Then
(again by Coherent Indifference),
2 = (W1 +W2)− 2W = (W1 −W )− (W −W2)
is indifferent from zero–a clear inconsistency. The upshot is that supplemented
RET sacrifices one of two clear desiderata, and there is no way to remedy this
situation by extending supplemented RET’s domain of comparison.
The culprit is plainly the second emendation. One option is to simply bite the
bullet and live with intransitivity and/or incoherence. Colyvan and Ha´jek appear
to do just that, if uncomfortably: “Recall that RET needed this account of state
identification to deliver various compelling dominance-like verdicts. But perhaps
we’ve jumped from the frying pan into the fire here.”
But RET did not need such an account of state identification to deliver the sought-
for verdicts. Indeed, when comparing experiments defined across distinct state
spaces, some join of these spaces should serve to model each. In the above example
involving Bet 1 and Bet 2 (where one may realistically assume that the tosses of
coin and die are independent, even if one is counterfactual), the independent
join is appropriate. This has four states: heads even, heads odd, tails even and
tails odd. Bet 1 will have payout vector (b1, b2, b3, b4) = (5, 5, 0, 0) and Bet 2 has
payout vector (a1, a2, a3, a4) = (6, 0, 6, 0) with P (X = i) =
1
4
, i = 1, 2, 3, 4. An
easy computation now gives REU(A,B) = 1
2
> 0, so A is preferable to B.
So it seems that Colyvan and Ha´jek’s account of state identification isn’t necessary
for RET after all, and there is nothing to prevent one from offering as extensions
of RET theories not subscribing to such an account. Indeed, the high cost of
Colyvan and Ha´jek’s second emendation would appear to preclude its adoption
so far as “conservative” extensions of RET are concerned. The implied directive
is clear: keep Colyvan and Ha´jek’s emendation to REU Dominance about or-
der independence, but jettison the supplement about identical distribution. The
resulting theory is a joint extension of expected utility theory and dominance
reasoning, and it accomplishes much in the way of Colyvan’s initial concerns:
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Relative Expectation Utility Theory (REUT): Let X be any random vari-
able taking values in the natural numbers N = {1, 2, . . .}. Let Game A pay ai and
let Game B pay bi when X = i. Define REU(A,B) =
∑
i∈N P (X = i)(ai − bi)
provided this sum’s value is independent of the order of the indices. (I.e. when-
ever E(aX − bX) has a value in the extended reals.) Then Game A is preferable
to Game B if and only if REU(A,B) ∈ (0,+∞]. Game A and Game B are
incommensurable if REU(A,B) is undefined.
REUT recovers the “clear” comparisons (Altadena preferable to Pasadena, etc.)
cited by Nover and Ha´jek. A further virtue is that it never indicates a preference
for a gamble X over an identically distributed gamble Y .
Theorem 1. Suppose that aX and bX are identically distributed and REU(A,B)
is defined. Then REU(A,B) = 0.
Proof.7 We may assume without loss of generality that REU(A,B) ≥ 0. Let
A and B be the random variables aX and bX , respectively. Suppose for reductio
that E(A − B) > 0. Fix k large enough that E(min{k,A − B}) > 0. Let An
and Bn be the truncations of A and B at [−n, n], respectively. (I.e. An = A
if |A| ≤ n, but An = n when A > n and An = −n when A < −n, etc.) One
easily checks that min{An − Bn, k} → min{A − B, k} almost surely. Moreover,
|min{An−Bn, k}| ≤ |min{A−B, k}|. So by the dominated convergence theorem,
E
(
min{An −Bn, k}
)→ E(min{A−B, k}) > 0.
But An and Bn are identically distributed, so for all large enough n
0 = E
(
An −Bn
) ≥ E(min{An −Bn, k}) > 0,
a contradiction. qed
4. Objections to REUT
As mentioned, agents subscribing to REUT do not ever prefer a gamble X to
an identically distributed gamble Y . They are also not subject to conventional
(finitary) Dutch Books. These are good properties for a decision theory to have,
but there are other desiderata that REUT seemingly fares not-so-well on.
First Objection: Group Dutch Books
Utility sharing groups of agents subscribing to REUT are vulnerable to “Group
Dutch Books” if the agents comprising the group can make unilateral decisions
and believe that it’s possible to confer a good of unbounded expected utility:
San Marino Game: Stanley and Stella are REUT subscribers married in the
state of Louisiana, where they have what is known as the Napoleonic Code (ac-
cording to which what belongs to the wife belongs to the husband also and vice
versa). Stanley (together with a lawyer acquaintance) has devised a plan capi-
talizing on the fact that a gift of money on Stella’s birthday is theoretically free
7Our original proof was needlessly complicated; the simplification is due to Ma´te´ Wierdl.
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under the Code. To liven things up, he presents to Stella a Huntington Library
postcard with an enclosed coupon reading “Happy Birthday Stell. Luck is believ-
ing you’re lucky! This coupon good for one Pasadena gamble, payable in dollars.”
Stella complains to her sister (Blanche) that although she has accepted the “gift”
she’s realized she could end up owing Stanley money under its terms. Blanche
(a sometime adjunct scholar) sees an opportunity and offers to administrate the
gamble. First, however, Blanche shows Stella a partition {Pi : i = 1, 2, . . .} of
the naturals such that, for every i, the expectation of the Pasadena gamble in
question exists and is equal to −∞ conditional on the gamble paying from a state
n ∈ Pi, and shows Stanley a partition {Qj : i = 1, 2, . . .} of the naturals such
that, for every j, the expectation of the Pasadena gamble in question exists and is
equal to +∞ conditional on the gamble paying from a state n ∈ Qj. She explains
to them both that the Pasadena gamble pays Pn with probability pn, n = 1, 2, . . .
and that they will learn which cell from their own partition contains n and be
given a chance to cancel their position (for a price) after receiving this informa-
tion but before learning the value of n. Blanche now puts Stanley and Stella to
sleep in separate rooms. While they are asleep she rolls dice to determine n, then
wakes them up. Blanche now goes to Stella and tells her the unique value i for
which n ∈ Pi. At this point Stella realizes that the expected value of the gamble,
from her perspective, is −∞. Blanche now offers, as she promised, to sell her a
short position in the same gamble–for a mere $5. Stella gives Blanche the money,
effectively cancelling her long position. Blanche then goes to Stanley and tells
him the unique value j for which n ∈ Qj. At this point Stanley realizes that the
expected value of the gamble, from his perspective, is +∞. Blanche now offers, as
she promised, to sell him a long position in the same gamble–for $150. He agrees
to the transaction, which effectively cancels both his own short position and her
long. The Stanley/Stella team has lost a sure $155–a “Group Dutch Book”.
Second Objection: Infinitary Dutch Books
A second objection is that single agents are subject to infinitary Dutch Books un-
der REUT. REUT does not assume that utility functions are bounded or that
state spaces are finite. But Vann McGee (1999) used an “airtight Dutch Book”
to seemingly show that the combination of infinite state space and unbounded
utility function leads expected utility theory subscribers to decision theoretic in-
coherence. McGee constructed a Dutch Book with payoffs wi, i = 1, 2, . . ..
What McGee failed to flag, however, was that his Dutch Book is infinitary, i.e.∑
iE
(
min{wi, 0}
)
= −∞. So while expected utility theory sanctions each bet
considered by itself, simultaneous acceptance of them would appear to violate
the spirit of REUT. Indeed, it’s an easy matter to express any given infinite
expectation wager as an infinite series of finite expectation wagers, so clearly
REUT must be taken to implicitly sanction against simultaneous acceptance (or
acceptance within any bounded window of time) terms constituting such a series.
But that won’t quite do. If you believe your lifespan to be finite almost surely but
to have infinite expected duration, a McGee-style Dutch Book can be administered
to you across time in such a way that the quantity of utility you risk in any fixed
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unit of time (a day, say) is universally bounded above. To see how, consider the
following twist on an experiment from Arntzenius, Elga and Hawthorne (2004):
Trumped. Donald Trump has just arrived in Purgatory. God explains that
the duration X of his afterlife will be an instance of the St. Petersburg random
variable (equal to 2n with probability 2−n), in days. Variety is the spice of the
afterlife, however, and Trump will have the option, on Day 1, of spending that
day in Hell in exchange for Days 4, 8, 12, . . . , 1020 in Heaven (each contingent on
his being around). This is an expected two days and he finds Heaven to be as
pleasant as Hell is unpleasant, so he takes the deal. On Day 2 he agrees to spend
that day in Hell in exchange for Days 1024, 1028, 1032, . . . , 218−4 in Heaven (again
an expected two days). And so forth...each day numbered 4n Trump spends in
Heaven, but he spends the other days in Hell in exchange for contingent days
28k+2, 28k+2 + 4, . . . , 28k+10 − 4 in Heaven, k = 2, 3, . . .. Expected utility theory
recommends each bet, but the result of accepting them all is that Trump spends
at least three-fourths of his afterlife in Hell.
Though Trump only accepts one wager per day, though their negative payoffs
are bounded below and though there are almost surely only finitely many such
wagers, the door is left open to the Dutch Bookie by the fact that their negative
expected payoffs nevertheless sum to minus infinity, due to the fact that the
expected number of wagers is infinite.
This sort of disaster can’t befall Trump if he knows his afterlife to have expected
duration (in days) E(X) = L < ∞. To see this, suppose Trump values x days
in Heaven at x utils, x days in Hell at −x utils, and x days in Purgatory at 0
utils. We will show that if Trump makes arbitrarily many gambles concerning
his daily whereabouts that are deemed fair by expected utility theory, then the
expectation of B = (total days spent in Heaven - total days spent in Hell) is zero.
To begin, note that
E(X) =
∞∑
n=1
P (X ≥ n) = L.
From the convergence of this series, it follows that NP (X ≥ N), which is at most
twice the value of
∑N
n=bN
2
c P (X ≥ n), tends to zero as N → ∞. For n ∈ N let
pn =
P (X≥n)
L
. Then
∑∞
n=1 pn = 1. Note that pn is the expected density of nth
days when Trump’s afterlife is iterated without end. Observe also that
P (X = n) =
pn − pn+1
p1
.
All of Trump’s fair gambles may be subsumed into a single gamble expressed by a
sequence (xn)
∞
n=1 taking values in [−1, 1], where xn = −1 indicates Trump spends
Day n in Hell, xn =
1
2
indicates Trump spends half of Day n in Heaven, etc. By
fairness,
∑∞
n=1 pnxn = 0. Note that∣∣pN+1 N∑
n=1
xn
∣∣ ≤ (N + 1)pN+1 ≤ (N + 1)P (X ≥ N + 1)→ 0,
HOW TO CO-EXIST WITH NONEXISTENT EXPECTATIONS 10
so that
E(B) =
∞∑
n=1
P (X = n)
n∑
i=1
xi
=
∞∑
n=1
pn − pn+1
p1
n∑
i=1
xi
=
1
p1
lim
N→∞
(
(p1 − p2)x1 + (p2 − p3)(x1 + x2) + · · · (pN − pN+1)(x1 + · · ·+ xN)
)
=
1
p1
lim
N→∞
( N∑
n=1
xnpn +−pN+1
N∑
n=1
xn
)
= 0.
Third Objection: Missed Arbitrages
Adam Elga (2010) has an arbitrage argument against imprecise credences that
can be turned against the REUT subscriber. Suppose you are offered a dollar to
take a long position in X, a no-expectation random variable. If you subscribe to
REUT then X and the dollar are not commensurable, so if you believe that the
offer is made in good faith then you’ll presumably decline it. Moments later you
are offered a dollar to take a short position in X. Again you decline. Nothing
changes if we assume that you have prior knowledge of the protocol. That’s
irrational, as accepting both offers strictly dominates rejecting them.
5. The Nature of REUT’s Idealization
To help motivate our response to the difficulties raised in the previous section,
consider the following passage, from McGee (1999):
...a global plan cannot afford to ignore exotic possibilities, or to fail to
allow for unusually complicated systems of acts and consequences. Now
no one would hope for a plan that would invariably enable us to overcome
adverse circumstances or vicious enemies, but one would at least hope for
a plan that would enable us to avoid being defeated by our own ill-planned
actions.
We do not deny that our credence functions cannot afford to ignore exotic possibil-
ities. (Recall the failures of RNP in Section 2.) For fixed n, Trump for example
ought not to assign zero probability to the prospect of his having an afterlife
2n days in duration. That hardly implies, however, that he should assign this
prospect the face value probability 2−n! To ignore an exotic possiblity is to assign
it zero credence, so there are many ways to “not ignore” such possibilities that
fall far short of taking their advertised chances at face value. In particular, one
can assign such events non-zero probabilties in such a way that the expectations
of decision-theoretic quantities (the duration of Trump’s afterlife, for example)
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come out finite. And, as we have seen, there is good reason for doing so. Namely,
so that one isn’t defeated by one’s own “ill-planned actions”.8
Note however that in doing so our REUT-subscribing agent has encountered a
problem. Her only advantage over an agent subscribing to conventional expected
utility theory was her ability to make comparisons between some pairs of no-
expectation gambles. She accomplished this in a way that avoids finitary Dutch
Books and never leads her to prefer a gamble X to an identically distributed
gamble Y , but it now seems that in order to avoid Group Dutch Books, Infinitary
Dutch Books and Missed Arbitrages, she now needs to shun credence functions
according to which real decision-theoretic quantities (such as her expected lifes-
pan) come out as having infinite expectation. But having done this, she can no
longer encounter gambles that, by her own lights, have no expectation! Has she
then eradicated her only advantage over the expected utility theoretician?
We don’t think she has, though our reasons are subtle, and possibly contentious;
we defer their presentation to the final section of the paper. Even for those who
do insist that REUT is a formally vacuous extension of EUT, however, it may
provide a means to simplify greatly many decision problems. Consider for example
the following trivial theorem, which shows that as doubts about veracity vanish
pointwise, correct action converges to REUT’s dictates.
Theorem 2. Suppose that a no-expectation gamble A pays ai and a different
no-expectation gamble B pays bi in state Si, where Prob(Si) = pi, i = 1, 2, . . ..
a. REUT favors A to B if and only if there is a δ > 0 having the property that
for every finite set F ⊂ N satisfying ∑n∈F c pn < δ,∑
i∈F
pi(ai − bi) > δ.
b. REUT favors A to B if and only if there is a δ > 0 having the property that
for any sequence (xn)
∞
n=1 with 0 ≤ xn ≤ 1 satisfying
∑
n∈N xn(|an| + |bn|) < ∞
and
∑
n∈N(1− xn)pn < δ, ∑
i∈F
xipi(ai − bi) > δ.
In b. one should think of xn as the expected ratio of relative delivered to relative
promised utility conditional on state Sn. (If an − bn = 10 and xn = .7 then the
expected gain from A−B in state n is 7.) The restriction∑n∈N xn(|an|+|bn|) <∞
is not technically necessary, though it will be satisfied for any agent who believes
that the gambles being advertised as A and B are actually finite in expectation.
The content of the theorem, then, is that REUT favors A to B precisely when any
sufficiently faithful joint implementation of the gambles consistent with restriction
to finite expectation results in an approximation of A that is preferable to the
8One may protest that the proposition stating that, for every n, the “actual chance” is indeed
2−n that Trump will have an afterlife 2n days in duration, is itself an “exotic possibility” that
we should not ignore. We address this issue in the next section.
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corresponding approximation of B. The relationship of REUT to comparisons
between commensurable infinite or no expectation (on their face) gambles, then,
is like that of EUT to comparisons between finite expectation gambles; it makes
the correct recommendation whenever the implementations are faithful enough.
6. Self indication and infinite expectation
In this final section we address the question of whether banishing variables of infi-
nite expectation is in conflict with “regularity” assumptions on which one should
not assign probability zero to any theory (e.g. offers advertised as St. Petersburg
gambles are genuine with positive probability) that is not logically contradictory.
In particular, we consider the following passage from Ha´jek (2006):
Suppose I offer you the St. Petersburg game. You don’t believe me; in fact
you assign probability one in a trillion to the offer being genuine. Still,
the paradox has a hold on you: for now the expectation of the game is a
trillionth of infinity, which is still infinity.
But for this point to be valid the agent (Trump, say) would have to assign positive
real probability to veracity after applying any relevant “anthropic reasoning”, and
varieties of anthropic reasoning on which such paradoxes remain uncontentiously
live are problematic. We believe that the correct method is that of Brandon
Carter (1983; see also A. Lewis 2001), who writes:
“In a typical application of the anthropic (self-selection) principle, one is
engaged in a scientific discrimination process of the usual kind in which one
wishes to compare the plausibility of a set of alternative hypotheses, H(Ti),
say, to the effect that respectively one or other of a corresponding set of
theories T1, T2, . . . is valid for some particular application in the light of
some observational or experimental evidence E, say. Such a situation can
be analysed in a traditional Bayesian framework by attributing a priori
and a posteriori plausibility values (i.e. formal probability measures),
denoted by pE and pS, say, to each hypothesis respectively before and
after the evidence E is taken into account, so that for any particular
result X one has
pE(X) = pS(X|E),
the standard symbol | indicating conditionality. According to the usual
Bayesian formula, the relative plausibility of two theories A and B, say, is
modified by a factor equal to the ratio of the corresponding conditional a
priori probabilities pS(E|A) and pS(E|B) for the occurrence of the result
E in the theories, i.e.
(1)
pE(A)
pE(B)
=
pS(E|A)
pS(E|B)
pS(A)
pS(B)
.”
The “Selected” or “Subjective” probability function pS in (1) is related to an
“Original” or “Objective” probability function pO by pS(·) = pO(·|S): “S de-
notes...the selection conditions that are implied by the hypothesis of application
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of the theory to a concrete experimental or observational situation, but which are
not necessarily included in the abstract theory” on which pO is based.
It’s implicit from Carter’s own usage of the principle that a “theory” meanwhile is
something like a measure on the set of universe histories rather than a chance or
ineliminably indexical event such as “this toss of this coin lands heads”. Examples
of “theories” from Carter (1983) include the hypotheses: life is very rare, even in
favorable conditions; gravitational coupling strength is fixed across time; and, the
expected average time t intrisically most likely for the evolution of a system of
observers intelligent enough to comprise a scientific civilization such as our own
is geometrically small relative to the main sequence lifetime τ of a typical star.
Indeed, where A is a theory your nomologically accessible evidential counterparts
(possible beings with thoughts indiscriminable from your own) should intend by
“A” the exact same proposition you intend by “A”; in particular, the two utter-
ances should be associated with the same truth value. (Your counterparts aren’t
actual beings contemplating a different coin or counterfactual beings for whom
the coin landed otherwise than it actually did.) The importance of this restriction
cannot be overstated, for Carter wishes to employ the identity
(2)
pS(A)
pS(B)
=
pO(A)
pO(B)
,
which will not in general be valid for “non-theory” events A and B.9
So long as one assigns positive probability to the theory that there are no infinite
expectation gambles, the expectation one ought to assign to an encountered St.
Petersburg gamble after applying Carter’s anthropic principle isn’t infinite, but
finite. To illustrate, suppose that Trump, on his first (and only) day in Purgatory,
is offered a St. Petersburg variable X of days in Heaven in exchange for Y days in
Hell, where Y is either 10 or 300 based on the toss of a fair coin. (Trump is told
the value of Y prior to making his choice.) We again suppose that Trump values x
days in Heaven at +x, x days in Hell at−x, and x days in Purgatory at 0. If Trump
refuses the offer, his afterlife terminates at the end of the day. If he accepts, it
terminates upon settlement. Trump is typical; every other conscious being in the
universe has the same afterlife experience (we assume their pre-afterlife lifetimes
are negligible) and that they are all rational and know the relevant protocols.
Suppose further that Trump entertains exactly two competing theories about the
universe. Theory A says that the St. Petersburg offers X that one encounters
in the afterlife are genuine. Theory B says that they are not genuine; in fact,
their true expectations are precisely 50 days. Prior to reasoning anthropically, he
assigns Theory A positive probability  < 1
2
. Finally, assume for emphasis that
Trump has amnesia upon awakening each morning, so that he awakens to find
himself in the afterlife but uncertain as to whether it’s Heaven, Hell or Purgatory–
it’s in this state that he assigns Theory A credence . According to the sort of
9Cf. Sleeping Beauty, where the majority intuition is that (2) fails for A = heads, B = tails,
vs. Bostrom’s “Presumptuous Philosopher”, where the majority intuition is that (2) holds for
A = trillion trillion persons and B = trillion trillion trillion persons. See Bostrom (2007).
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reasoning Ha´jek implicitly cites, then, the expected number of days Trump will
spend in Heaven, should he accept, is ()∞+ (1− )50 =∞. He should therefore
accept, regardless of the value Y .
If we take Carter’s anthropic principle into account, however, this computation
breaks down. Assume for the moment that every being accepts the offer of X days
in Heaven for Y days in Hell when Y = 10, but refuses when Y = 300. Let P be
the event “I am now in Purgatory”. Conditional on Theory B, half of all agents
encounter Y = 10 and accept the ensuing offer; these agents spend an average of
61 days in the afterlife (1 in Purgatory, 10 in Hell, and an expected 50 in Heaven).
The other half encounter Y = 300 and refuse the ensuing offer; these agents spend
1 day in the afterlife (in Purgatory). It follows that the expectation of Trump’s
afterlife conditional on B is 31 days, so that pS(P |B) is the multiplicative inverse
of this expectation, i.e. 1/31.
Next assume, for the time being, that E(X|A) is large but finite. Then
L =
1
2
(1) +
1
2
(
11 + E(X|A)) = 6 + 1
2
E(X|A)
is the expectation of Trump’s afterlife conditional on A. pS(P |A), meanwhile, is
equal to L−1. One therefore has
pP (A)
pP (B)
=
pS(P |A)
pS(P |B)
pS(A)
pS(B)
=
L−1
1/31

1− ,
from which it follows that pP (A) =
31
31+L(1−) and pP (B) =
L(1−)
31+L(1−) . Trump
now computes the posterior expectation of X as follows:
E(X) = pP (A)E(X|A) + pP (B)E(X|B) ≈ 31(2L− 12)
31+ L(1− ) +
L(1− )(50)
31+ L(1− ) .
Letting L→∞, we get E(X) = 62
1− + 50 ≤ 112 when E(X|A) =∞.10
Suppose next that the agents do accept when Y = 300. Then the expectation of
afterlife duration conditional on B would be 1
2
(61 + 351) = 206 and the expecta-
tion of afterlife duration conditional on A would be L = 156 + E(X|A), so that
pS(P |B) = 1206 and pS(P |A) = L−1. So
pP (A)
pP (B)
=
pS(P |A)
pS(P |B)
pS(A)
pS(B)
=
L−1
1/206

1− ,
from which it follows that pP (A) =
206
206+L(1−) and pP (B) =
L(1−)
206+L(1−) . So:
E(X) = pP (A)E(X|A) + pP (B)E(X|B) ≈ 206(L− 156)
206+ L(1− ) +
L(1− )(50)
206+ L(1− ) .
10This seems a fair way to compute E(X); one might also attempt to establish this conclusion
“nonstandardly” by letting L be an appropriate infinite hyperreal (so that L−1 is infinitesimal).
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Letting L → ∞, E(X) = 206
1− + 50 ≤ 256 when E(X|A) = ∞. So E(X) < 300
whether the agents accept when Y = 300 or not. (Whence they don’t.)
If that’s right, then Ha´jek wasn’t entitled to the claim that assigning even a tiny
positive probility to a claimed St. Petersburg variable’s veracity requires you to
assign the variable an infinite unconditional expectation. Indeed, Carter’s an-
thropic principle establishes something like the opposite. Namely, that assigning
positive probability to the theory that faithful St. Petersburg gambles are impos-
sible requires you to assign gambles advertised as St. Petersburg gambles finite
unconditional expectation whenever they are encountered.
This computation dissolves, in particular, the worries of Section 4 without making
REUT a vacuous extension of EUT. Note however that the computation cannot
be adapted to arrive at a (unique) definite expectation for the Pasadena gamble;
one would (in theory) obtain finite upper and lower bounds on the expected
utility of a Pasadena gamble by this method, but where in the resulting interval
one landed by any proposed limiting procedure would be sensitive to the order
of the indices. This reassures one that REUT is on the right track. It also
supports Nover and Ha´jek’s (2004) contention that “the Pasadena game is more
paradoxical than the St. Petersburg game in several respects.”
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